Who Pays Attention? Firm Size, Information, and Monetary Non-Neutrality
- Larger firms pay more attention to inflation but pass through less of their cost changes to prices.
- This relationship increases aggregate price rigidity and shapes the real effects of monetary policy.
Abstract
A large literature that microfounds information frictions as a source of monetary non-neutrality emphasizes average firm attention to monetary shocks—summarized by the average Kalman gain, or the weight firms place on new information—as the key statistic governing the degree of monetary non-neutrality. I use an LLM to construct a measure of inflation attention from firms' 10-K filings and apply a state-space model to recover the implied Kalman gains. I find that this attention is systematically related to firm size, with larger firms being more attentive. I develop a model of heterogeneous firms and endogenous information acquisition that rationalizes this gradient. Firm size is a first-order determinant of the profit loss from mispricing and therefore of the incentive to acquire information. I then show that when firm size is also systematically related to firms' pricing behavior—their partial-equilibrium cost pass-through—the allocation of attention across firms matters for aggregate price rigidity. In the empirically relevant case in which larger firms have lower cost pass-through, the negative covariance between attention and cost pass-through increases aggregate price rigidity. Aggregate price rigidity is governed by a small set of firm-level steady-state objects: firm size, cost pass-through, demand elasticity, and the Kalman gain. Using empirical measures of these objects, I find that the implied Phillips curve is about 40% flatter than under a CES benchmark, in which all firms have complete partial-equilibrium cost pass-through. The endogenous allocation of attention accounts for about one-third of this flattening. I calibrate the structural model to the U.S. economy in the 2010s and obtain a flattening of similar magnitude. Finally, I conduct a counterfactual in which I shift the productivity distribution to restore top-firm concentration to its 1990 level, allowing information acquisition to adjust endogenously. I show that changes in market structure can have substantially different effects on monetary non-neutrality once the allocation of attention is allowed to respond.